The Battle of Aspindza

The Battle of Aspindza: A Crucial Victory in the Face of Imperial Ambition in Georgia in the 18th Century

An important moment in Georgian history was the Battle of Aspindza, which took place on April 20, 1770, and saw the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti defeat the Ottoman Empire’s forces handily. In the larger geopolitical context of the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), Georgia, led by King Erekle II, sided with Russia to establish a second front against the Sublime Porte. King Erekle II’s extraordinary strategic skill and the Georgian army’s incredible fortitude are what make the battle so famous, especially in light of the contentious and sudden withdrawal of their Russian allies under General Gottlieb Totleben just hours before the main conflict.

Despite severe numerical disadvantage and betrayal by allies, the victory momentarily strengthened Georgian independence hopes. But it also brought to light the intricate and frequently dishonest character of Georgia’s alliances, especially with the growing Russian Empire. The Aspindza events set a precedent for Russia’s self-serving and opportunistic policies in the Caucasus, which had a significant impact on the future course of Georgian sovereignty and Russo-Georgian relations.

Conflict Precursors and the Geopolitical Context

Historically situated as a geopolitical center in the South Caucasus, Georgia was constantly torn between the Ottoman Empire’s and the Persian Safavids’ and later the Qajars’ conflicting imperial aspirations to the west and east, respectively. The Georgian kingdoms, especially Kartli and Kakheti, were subjected to constant invasions, economic destruction, and coordinated attempts by these powerful nations to impose their political and cultural structures because of their vulnerable location. Significant changes in the balance of power in the region occurred in the 15th and 16th centuries, including the collapse of the Byzantine and Trebizond empires, which left Georgia encircled by strong enemies and more cut off from European contacts. Internal disintegration and aggressive campaigns to subjugate Georgia by Iran and Turkey were the hallmarks of this era. Aspindza is situated in the Samtskhe region, which was renamed the “Gurjistan vilayet” after enduring centuries of Ottoman domination.

The Georgian rulers had to have a practical, but frequently risky, foreign policy because of the ongoing external pressures and internal conflicts. In order to combat the widespread Turkish and Persian influence along Georgia’s southern borders, King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti, like his father, King Teimuraz II, repeatedly pursued a military alliance with the emerging Russian Empire. This partnership was seen as strategically necessary, providing a way to free Georgian lands, particularly Meskheti, from long-term Ottoman rule. A long-standing geopolitical strategy motivated by existential concerns is highlighted by the Georgian monarchs’ persistent attempts to establish such alliances with Russia in opposition to Ottoman and Persian threats. The nation’s fight for self-preservation against overwhelming imperial ambitions is highlighted by the recurrent theme in Georgian history of seeking a strong external patron to ensure survival and independence.

In the eyes of Russia, which had established itself as a major regional force since 1721, the Orthodox Georgians were a promising new ally. Russia was able to secure unrestricted access across the mountains, advancing its interests in the strategically important region between the Black and Caspian Seas and reducing the influence of its Ottoman and Persian rivals, by gaining control or influence over the Georgian lands south of the Greater Caucasus ridge. Therefore, it is important to view the Battle of Aspindza as a single incident within Georgia’s ongoing fight for independence and survival against more powerful imperial powers, rather than just as a localized conflict. This larger background transforms the conflict from a minor skirmish into a powerful representation of the nation’s tenacity in the face of insurmountable obstacles.

The Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774) included the Battle of Aspindza. General Gottlieb Totleben led a Russian expeditionary force that was sent to Georgia in 1769 by Empress Catherine II. The goal was to divert Ottoman forces and relieve pressure on the main Russian front by establishing a “second front” in the Caucasus. As the first organized Russian military force to cross the Caucasus into Transcaucasia, this was a historic event. Due to Russia’s own imperial aspirations in the Caucasus, King Erekle II’s alliance with Russia carried inherent risks even though it seemed like a strategic necessity. As future events would show, this alliance had two sides: it provided immediate military support but also opened the door for Russian dominance in the future. Later events would show that Russia’s long-term strategy was to weaken Georgia or permit it to be weakened in order to facilitate its eventual annexation. The battle became a microcosm of this greater geopolitical dynamic due to the fundamental difference in goals—Russia seeking control, Georgia seeking liberation.

The Campaign: The Russian-Georgian Alliance and Its Disintegration

In March 1770, the combined Russian-Georgian forces gathered in Surami to begin the campaign that would lead to Aspindza. General Totleben led a Russian force of 1,200 soldiers, while King Erekle II commanded a Georgian contingent of about 7,000 soldiers. King Erekle II’s main goal was to free Meskheti from Ottoman domination, and they both planned to march through the Borjomi Valley in the direction of Akhaltsikhe, the Ottoman Childir Eyalet’s capital. On April 14, the allied forces took control of the Sadgueri fortress, and on April 17, they besieged the Atsquri fortress.

But King Erekle II and General Totleben soon found themselves at odds over how to proceed with the campaign. King Erekle II argued that direct contact with the Ottoman provincial capital would be more decisive and urged an immediate advance on Akhaltsikhe. Since he thought that the capture of Akhaltsikhe would inevitably result in the resolution of the Atsquri situation, he considered the lengthy siege of the hard-to-reach fortress with a small garrison, Atsquri, to be a waste of time and resources. Conversely, Totleben obstinately maintained the siege of Atsquri, believing it was strategically foolish to abandon a strong enemy position behind them. According to some accounts, his plans for attacking and besieging Atsquri were seriously flawed. The two commanders’ strategic disagreement reveals a basic difference in their goals. Erekle II’s determination to advance on Akhaltsikhe was a blatant indication of a national goal: the reclaiming of Georgian territory. However, Totleben’s denial and subsequent behavior ran counter to the idea of a genuine partnership founded on common objectives. This implies that Russia’s main goal was to create a power vacuum or dependency that it could use to further its own imperial expansion, rather than to free Georgia.

On April 19, 1770, the alliance’s divisions became much more pronounced. On April 18, General Totleben unexpectedly withdrew his 1,200-man Russian contingent from the siege and began a retreat back towards Georgia after the Pasha of Akhaltsikhe sent a 2,000-strong auxiliary force to Atsquri. The Georgian army was severely disrupted by this abrupt departure, which the Ottomans tried to take advantage of by swarming out of the fortress. With outstanding leadership, King Erekle II quickly brought his troops back into line, launched a counteroffensive, and drove the Ottoman sally back into Atsquri. Erekle II was forced to order a retreat towards Aspindza, where he was being pursued by superior Turkish forces, after losing his Russian allies. This strategic disagreement between Erekle II and Totleben, while presented as a tactical dispute, appears to have been a pretext for a deeper betrayal. According to accounts, Totleben’s ultimate goal was to give the Ottoman Empire the opportunity to destroy King Erekle II and the Kartli-Kakhetian army, which would make it easier for Russia to integrate the kingdom into its expanding empire. This deliberate act of sabotage exposes a cynical and manipulative side of Russian imperial policy rather than just a tactical error. The annexation of Kartli-Kaketi decades later was the culmination of future examples of Russian opportunistic behavior toward Georgia.

The Battle of Aspindza: A Masterwork of Tactics

The Battle of Aspindza occurred on April 20, 1770, close to the southern Georgian town of Aspindza, which is roughly located at 41°34′26.76″N 43°14′58.88″E. The Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti were the main combatants.

King Erekle II (Heraclius II) commanded the center of the army and led the Georgian forces. Prince George (Giorgi Batonishvili, later King George XII) commanded the left flank, while General David Orbeliani led the right. Gola Pasha and Kokhta-Beladi, the Avar leader, were among the Ottoman commanders who lost their lives in the conflict.

Historical sources differ in their estimates of troop strength. Although some accounts indicate an initial force of around 7,000 men prior to the Russian withdrawal, and one source indicates about 2,000 men, the estimated number of Georgian forces was around 3,000. The numbers for the Ottomans vary from 9,500 to 8,000. Interestingly, some reports state that “approximately 18,000 soldiers of the main Turkish forces” arrived at the Kura River, implying that there were more Ottoman soldiers in total. Historical records frequently show disparities in reported troop strengths, which emphasizes the difficulties in accurate reconstruction. Nonetheless, the overwhelming numerical advantage of the Ottoman army, which emphasizes the scope of the Georgian victory, is the recurring theme in all of the information that is currently available. Because of this numerical disadvantage, King Erekle II’s victory highlights the tactical genius needed to overcome such odds and is a particularly remarkable achievement of military strategy and leadership.

King Erekle II’s forces were forced to retreat after General Totleben’s sudden departure, and they were being actively pursued by superior Turkish troops who wanted to cut off his lines of defense close to Aspindza. Erekle II first faced and defeated a 1,500-man Ottoman advance guard on April 20. The Ottoman ranks reportedly became fearful as a result of this early success. After this battle, King Erekle II made a calculated and bold strategic move by allowing the main Ottoman forces—estimated to number between 8,000 and 18,000—to cross the Kura (Mtkvari) River close to Aspindza. Allowing a larger enemy force to cross the river instead of trying to hold the riverbank shows a thorough knowledge of the terrain and the psychological effects of trapping a larger enemy. This effectively turns a tactical retreat into a strategic trap. A complete, haphazard withdrawal is a common reaction to being outnumbered and deserted. However, Erekle’s actions demonstrated a calculated, counterintuitive strategy, demonstrating excellent military acumen and confidence in his troops, and transforming a precarious situation into a chance for a decisive engagement.

The night of April 20 was the battle’s pivotal moment. Aghabab Eristavi and Simon Moukhranbatoni (Svimon Mukhranbatoni) led a Georgian contingent in a bold operation to demolish the only bridge that connected the Kura River’s two banks. The Ottoman forces were essentially cut off from their reserves and stranded on the riverbank as a result of this action. A crucial tactical move that turned the conflict into a rout was the bridge’s destruction. It demonstrates the Georgian army’s discipline and effectiveness even in the face of numerically superior forces, underscoring the critical importance of intelligence, coordination, and quick execution in military operations. The bridge’s destruction was a deliberate part of Erekle’s plan, which turned the river from a crossing point into an impassable barrier by obstructing the Ottoman escape route and causing a bottleneck. The fact that this maneuver was carried out at night suggests that the Georgian forces were highly sophisticated militarily, as evidenced by their excellent reconnaissance and well-coordinated special operations.

The Georgian army unexpectedly attacked the stranded Ottoman forces at dawn. In the Georgian battle formation, Prince George commanded the left flank, David Orbeliani the right, and King Erekle II the center. The Ottomans were overrun since they were totally unprepared and had nowhere to flee. The Georgian charge proved too strong for the enemy, who launched a chaotic withdrawal in the direction of the fallen bridge, where hundreds of people perished while trying to cross the Kura River by swimming.

The Georgians won the Battle of Aspindza by a landslide. Estimates of Ottoman forces’ losses range from about 4,000 to over 4,500, with some reports putting the death toll as high as 6,000. Prominent commanders like Gola Pasha and Kokhta-Beladi, the leader of the Avar, were among the dead. Georgia’s losses, on the other hand, were incredibly low; they were described as “unknown, less,” “insignificant,” or even as low as 25 casualties. The extremely lopsided death toll, with relatively few Georgian casualties in contrast to significant Ottoman losses, highlights the success of King Erekle II’s strategy and the Georgian army’s faultless performance. This lopsided result is a testament to the strategic genius that turned a numerical deficit into a resounding win. Numerous flags, horses, and weapons were also taken by the Georgians.

Historical Interpretations and Discussions of General Totleben’s Actions

The historical account of the Aspindza campaign is still controversial due to General Gottlieb Totleben’s involvement in it. According to accounts, Totleben was “chased for common law crime” from Thuringia before obtaining high-level positions in Russia, making him an “adventurer” with a dubious past. Interpretations of his actions during the campaign are influenced by this background.

Importantly, historical interpretations, especially those by A. Manvelichvili makes the compelling argument that Totleben’s sudden withdrawal was a willful act of betrayal rather than just the result of a strategic disagreement. According to these accounts, Totleben had a deliberate plan to “let the Ottoman Empire completely destroy the Kartli-Kakhetian army along with the king,” which would allow Russia to “easily incorporate the kingdom into the country.” His plan to “use Russian forces for a coup d’état” to take over Georgia after kidnapping King Heraclius is further supported by other sources. Further escalating tensions and exposing a pervasive prejudice that probably shaped his actions were Totleben’s contempt for Georgian commanders, whom he allegedly considered “ignorant orientals,” and his insistence that Georgian officers be barred from the combined army.

This account of Totleben’s deception serves as the main focal point for scholarly opinions, especially in Georgian historiography. The information that is currently available continuously supports the Georgian perspective of betrayal, even though it does not offer several opposing interpretations from various national perspectives. According to this widely accepted interpretation, Totleben’s actions were a deliberate move by Russia to make Georgia more vulnerable to annexation in the future. This depiction of Totleben’s betrayal, which is repeatedly emphasized in different sources, points to a generally held historical interpretation and may represent a Georgian national narrative about Russian intent. This viewpoint provides a critical lens for examining the intricate and frequently tense history of relations between Russia and Georgia.

A recurring theme in Russian foreign policy can be seen in the clear declarations regarding Totleben’s desire to permit the Ottomans to decimate the Georgian army in order to make it easier for Russia to conquer the kingdom. This was not just a renegade general’s goal; rather, it was part of Russia’s larger historical objective to “weaken Georgia or to let it be weakened in order to subsequently conquer it.” Totleben’s individual acts are transformed from a singular incident into a lucid illustration of a long-term Russian imperial strategy in the Caucasus by this methodical approach. The Treaty of Giorgievsk and the Battle of Krtsanisi, which ultimately resulted in Georgia’s annexation, are just two examples of the dangerous precedent it sets for future Russian interventions and betrayals.

Long-Term Historical Importance and Effect

Both Georgia and the Ottoman Empire experienced immediate and significant repercussions from the Battle of Aspindza. Georgia’s resounding victory secured Meskheti and temporarily stopped Ottoman expansion into the Kartli-Kakheti heartland, proving the kingdom’s incredible ability to defend itself even when its allies deserted it. The loss of important commanders and severe casualties marked a major setback for the Ottoman Empire in their Russo-Turkish War campaign in the Caucasus.

Even with the military victory, the fledgling Georgian-Russian trust was badly damaged by Totleben’s desertion at Aspindza. This incident revealed Russia’s underlying imperial motives and glaringly demonstrated the unreliability of their military assistance. Nevertheless, King Erekle II was forced to turn once more to Russia for protection due to ongoing external threats from the Ottoman and Persian empires. As a result, the Treaty of Giorgievsk was signed in 1783, formally placing Kartli-Kakheti under Russian protection and supposedly committing Russia to military support. Russia’s later breach of the Treaty of Giorgievsk and its subsequent abandonment of Georgia during the catastrophic Persian invasion of 1795 were both directly foreshadowed by Totleben’s abandonment at Aspindza. A distinct, long-term pattern of Russian imperial policy is established by the constant claim in various sources that Russia’s ultimate objective was to “easily incorporate the kingdom into the country” or “to weaken Georgia or to let it be weakened in order to subsequently conquer it.” Despite being a Georgian victory, Aspindza ironically exposed the fatal weakness in Georgia’s defense strategy, which depended on Russia. The loss of Georgian independence in the early 19th century was directly caused by this early, unmistakable indication of Russia’s true intentions rather than an isolated incident.

Totleben’s actions during the Battle of Aspindza were a precursor to Russia’s long-term strategy toward Georgia, which was to weaken Georgia or let its enemies weaken it before taking advantage of its weakness to conquer and annex it. With origins dating back to the 16th century, this policy persisted into the 18th and 19th centuries. The conflict is frequently seen in light of Russia’s later betrayals, especially the abandonment during the catastrophic Persian invasion of 1795 (the Battle of Krtsanisi), which considerably weakened Eastern Georgia and eventually made it easier for Russia to annex it.

Thus, the Battle of Aspindza serves as a potent representation of Georgian tenacity and fortitude against both allied perfidy and external aggression. It emphasizes how difficult it is for a smaller country sandwiched between two powerful empires to maintain its independence and how expensive geopolitical maneuvering can be. Georgia’s military prowess and King Erekle II’s leadership were proven by their victory at Aspindza. However, a renewed reliance on Russia and eventual annexation followed this military victory, which did not result in long-term security or independence. This brings to light a terrible conundrum facing smaller nations in a multipolar world: even major military triumphs may not guarantee their long-term independence if they are trapped between more powerful, predatory nations. As a result, the Battle of Aspindza provides a historical case study on the boundaries of military success when strong geopolitical stability and trustworthy alliances are lacking.

Memorialization and Cultural Legacy

In Georgian cultural memory and national consciousness, the Battle of Aspindza is deeply ingrained. The well-known Georgian poet Besiki (Besik Gabashvili) wrote a patriotic ode titled “On the Battle of Aspindza,” which is famously about it. Besiki’s poetry is known for its “intense dramatism” and its active participation in the “national political-social reality,” often combining Christian symbolism and “national folk motives.” His writings, such as the ode on Aspindza, went beyond traditional “chamber poetry” to speak to more general national issues. The fact that this ode exists at all emphasizes how the battle affected Georgian national identity both immediately and over time, making it a representation of bravery and unwavering resistance.

In Aspindza, Georgia, a statue of a horse was erected in 2017 as a physical tribute to the conflict and its protagonist, King Erekle II. The historical event is commemorated explicitly by an inscription on its base that reads, “On April 20 1770 the Georgian army under the command of King Erekle II, achieved a great victory over Turkish soldiers.” This statue honors a king whose reign is frequently considered the “swan song” of the Georgian monarchy in a permanent way. The battle has been ingrained in Georgia’s national narrative and collective memory, as evidenced by the presence of Besiki’s patriotic ode and the contemporary equestrian statue of Erekle II, as well as the general association of Aspindza with “many important Georgian victories.” This shows that, especially in the face of perceived allied betrayal, the Battle of Aspindza is more than just a historical event; it is a potent symbol of national tenacity, strategic genius, and the unwavering spirit of independence. These ideals are actively upheld by its cultural memorialization, which also makes a substantial contribution to the continuous development of Georgian national identity.

A rich history of civilization and ongoing conflict is reflected in the Aspindza Municipality’s abundance of medieval Georgian monuments, which include venerable fortresses, ancient caves, and revered monasteries. The Vardzia cave monastery complex, which was a crucial cultural hub and defensive stronghold in the past, is one of these important locations. It dates back to the 12th and 13th centuries. For example, Vardzia repelled Persian attacks in 1551 after receiving a sizable Georgian army, including Queen Tamar, that had been assembled from all over the nation in 1203 prior to the Battle of Basiani. The fortified cities of Tmogvi and Khertvisi, as well as the Vanis Kvabebi cave complex, are other noteworthy monuments in the area. Other significant conflicts, like Giorgi Saakadze’s 1625 victory over the Qizilbash army near Aspindza, also leave their mark on the history of the area. As evidence of its long-standing strategic significance, the name “Aspindza” itself is associated with many Georgian triumphs and originally denoted a “hotel” or “resting station” on a major road. Ancient settlements and strongholds are still being discovered in the Akhaltsikhe-Aspindza region as a result of ongoing archaeological investigations. The battle of Aspindza in 1770 was not a singular event, but rather a continuation of a long-standing historical pattern of resistance in a strategically significant area, as this larger historical context makes clear. It emphasizes how significant locations like Aspindza have always been to Georgia’s history, acting as a continual reminder of ongoing hardships and sporadic victories.

Conclusion: Legacy and Lasting Lessons

Against a numerically superior Ottoman force, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti under King Erekle II triumphed in the Battle of Aspindza on April 20, 1770, showcasing remarkable tactical skill and unwavering fortitude. One crucial tactic that ensured a resounding victory was the strategic destruction of the Kura River bridge, which severely damaged the enemy while reducing Georgian losses. This military triumph, which was attained in spite of the treacherous desertion by Russian allies, demonstrated Georgia’s ability to defend itself and the genius of its leadership.

In terms of politics, the conflict was a clear example of Georgia’s vulnerable status as a state torn between strong imperial aspirations. More importantly, it revealed the Russian alliance’s deceit, especially in light of General Totleben’s willful withdrawal. This incident was not an isolated incident; rather, it was a foreshadowing of Russia’s long-term imperial plan to erode Georgia and then annex it. Aspindza demonstrated the pattern of Russian policy that would tragically develop over the next few decades, culminating in the Treaty of Giorgievsk and the catastrophic Battle of Krtsanisi, which ultimately led to Georgia’s accession to the Russian Empire.

Aspindza is ingrained in Georgian culture and national memory. The battle has become a potent representation of national strength, strategic brilliance, and the never-ending fight for independence thanks to pieces like Besiki’s patriotic ode and the equestrian statue of King Erekle II in Aspindza. This story is further supported by the area’s abundance of historical monuments, which place the victory of 1770 within a lengthy tradition of Georgian resistance.

Aspindza’s lasting impact goes beyond a particular military conflict. It marks a turning point that shed light on the intricate relationship between imperial ambition, diplomatic scheming, and military might in the South Caucasus. Although tragically repeated in later historical episodes, the lessons learned from Aspindza had a significant impact on subsequent Georgian foreign policy and the eventual path towards Russian annexation. The battle demonstrated Georgia’s innate ability to defend itself while also highlighting the grave risks of depending on untrustworthy “allies.” It continues to be a potent representation of Georgian tenacity and a moving reminder of the ongoing difficulties faced by smaller countries negotiating a world full of rival superpowers.